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Abstract 
The right to privacy is a fundamental human right under international law. The right to 
privacy for an individual is the right to hide or obscure elements of their life from the wider 
public. In the modern age the need for privacy is becoming increasingly difficult in light of 
modern communication companies which seek to make once which was considered private, 
public. The right to privacy has historically not been at the forefront of discussions within the 
international community and the United Nations. This position changed after the Edward 
Snowden and Cambridge Analytica revelations. The focus from the international community 
is on addressing not only the practices of state sponsored surveillance but also surveillance 
undertaken by modern communications companies. This article will focus on how the United 
Nations, the international community and international law aim to bring surveillance 
practices in line with human rights law and what privacy means in the modern digital age.  
The first part of the article will look at the inherent right to privacy, the second part will cover 
the recent developments from the United Nations and international law and the third part will 
look at the challenges ahead in the modern age of surveillance and digital communication. 
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1. Introduction 
The right to privacy is seen as a fundamental human right contained in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)1 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).2 The right to privacy however has historically not been at the forefront of 





changed in 2013 after the Edward Snowden revelations. The international community was 
focused on addressing not only on the practices of state sponsored surveillance but also 
surveillance undertaken by modern communications companies.3 
The basis of the international community and the United Nations in particular was the 
application and interpretation of Article 17 of the ICCPR and more recently the United 
Nations Resolution of Privacy in the Digital Age4 and how to bring surveillance practices in 
line with human rights law and what is privacy means in the modern digital age.   
The modern international law jurisprudence holds states accountable for their actions (not in 
all cases) based on the effective control test.5  There has also been a suggestion of a different 
approach which is based on virtual control within the legal boundaries of holding states 
accountable over there surveillance activities while upholding the individual’s right to 
privacy over their own communications.6 
Recent events such as 2013 Edward Snowden and 2018 Cambridge Analytica revelations has 
shown that there needs to be an international legal solution to communication surveillance by 
states sometimes referred to as the Five Eyes7 states and by communication-based companies 
such as Facebook. Activities which use surveillance without an individual’s permission is in 
clear breach of Article 17 of the ICCPR. Despite the exposure of such practices (Snowden 
and Cambridge Analytica in particular) there has been a slow process of an agreement of how 
to bring these practices in line with international human rights law. 
This article will deal with some of these challenges.  The first part of the article will look at 
inherent right to privacy, the second part will cover the recent developments from the United 
Nations and international law, the third part will look at the challenges ahead in the modern 
age of surveillance and digital communication. 
 
2. The meaning of privacy 
The international community has been slow in responding to changes in technologies which 
are based on communication and data collection, leaving international law trying to catch up 
and regulate a growing concern for the protection of privacy of states and the individual. 
Article 12 of the UDHR 1948 states the following: 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 





1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation.  
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.  
In 1988 this was further expanded in General Comment No 16 on Article 17 ICCPR.8 This 
Comment explained: 
1. Article 17 provides for the right of every person to be protected against arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence as well as 
against unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. In the view of the Committee 
this right is required to be guaranteed against all such interferences and attacks 
whether they emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal persons. The 
obligations imposed by this article require the State to adopt legislative and other 
measures to give effect to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks as 
well as to the protection of this right.  
2. In this connection, the Committee wishes to point out that in the reports of States 
parties to the Covenant the necessary attention is not being given to information 
concerning the manner in which respect for this right is guaranteed by legislative, 
administrative or judicial authorities, and in general by the competent organs 
established in the State. In particular, insufficient attention is paid to the fact that 
article 17 of the Covenant deals with protection against both unlawful and arbitrary 
interference. That means that it is precisely in State legislation above all that 
provision must be made for the protection of the right set forth in that article. At 
present the reports either say nothing about such legislation or provide insufficient 
information on the subject.  
The ICCPR was in 1966 was not equipped to look at the threat to individual privacy from 
data collection and digital technologies because these technologies simply did not exist.  
Therefore, the definition of privacy is regarded as narrow in today’s technological advances 
in communication and data collection. The 1988 General Comment only goes further to 
distinguish the incoming threat of data collection by states and the protection of states from 
individual’s private data being interfered with. Again, however, a full appreciation of 
technologies concerning communication and information were not fully understood as the use 
of these technologies and the internet were in their infancy. 
The way individuals communicate and the collection of data by states and technology 
companies seems to be commonly understood as being part of the digital age. But there needs 
to be discussion to look again at the General Comment from 1988 and an update for this new 
decade and beyond. The discussion was enhanced9by the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
Frank La Rue10 and by the General Assembly.11 The reason for an update is clear, there needs 





protect in light of the obligations of not only states but the more difficult notion of companies 
under international law. 
The current General Comment to Article 1712 states that ‘the gathering and holding of 
personal information on computers, databanks and other devices by public authorities or 
private bodies must be regulated by law.’13  Also it can be seen that this has been agreed upon 
by the Human Rights Committee (HRC)14 and this guiding statement of Article 17 has been 
followed in a number of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions.   
This guiding statement of Article 17 has been followed in a number of European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions. Indeed, the United Nations and the international 
community can take note of the ECtHR’s decision in Botta v Italy15, MK v France16, S and 
Marper v the UK17 and Bensaid v the UK18 that the notion of ‘private life is not an exhaustive 
decision.’19  The court, therefore, does not feel that a definition on what is a private life can 
ever be fully comprehensive and include all aspects that an individual might feel are private. 
The ECtHR also stated that the very ‘protection of personal data is of fundamental 
importance to a person’s enjoyment of respect for his or her personal data and family life.’20 
The United Nations and the international community therefore should also take into account 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)`s decisions on this matter.  A landmark 
decision came in Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner.21 This is seen as one of the most 
important international privacy cases in recent history. The case was based on a complaint 
against Facebook brought to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (IDPC). In the 
complaint Schrems challenged the transfer of his data to the United States by Facebook in 
light of Facebook USA alleged involvement with the PRISM mass surveillance program.22  
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) made the Safe Harbor arrangement of 
collection and data transfer between EU and US invalid. Schrems complaint was based on 
EU data protection law, which does not allow data transfers to non-EU countries, unless the 
company transferring and storing the data can guarantee adequate protection. The Court 
found that there was not the adequate protection needed in line with the EU data protection 
law and deemed that the Safe Harbor agreement ‘must be declared invalid.’23  The Court also 
expressed that ‘legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalized 
basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the 
essence of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union.’24   
 
2.1. Is there a right to obscurity in the digital age? 
 
Privacy is an essential human need and an essential fundamental human right. The difficulty 
comes that the term privacy itself can be an abstract concept which at times is difficulty to 
define but all humans need the knowledge to know that elements of their private lives will be 






With the rise of new technologies, it is difficult to know where this fundamental right to 
privacy extends or even exists. With the internet and social media, it has become almost 
impossible to protect these fundamental rights and almost impossible for an individual to 
become invisible and keep themselves completely private. 
 
Under the modern framework of international law, the protection of privacy for individuals 
depends entirely on constitutional limitations and states willingness to be adhere to 
international legal treaties and by bound by them. International law has however benefited 
from international custom as a source of law which means that the practice of certain types of 
actions will be enough to be recognised as binding on state parties. Article 38 of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ)25 Statute lists the sources of law in this regard and 
specifically sets out the importance of customary international law.26 Customary international 
law has the status of law because the ICJ considers custom as ‘evidence of a general practice 
accepted by law’ and therefore ‘part of the corpus of general international law’.27  
International customary law has at its core decision making value through state practice 
which can then evolve into a legal norm through consistent usage and then a final stage that 
this custom is accepted by the international community.28 This is seen as a unique passage of 
law making within international law itself that the recognition of a custom or right can be 
enforced internationally without the express written agreement and consent of the sovereign 
power. 
 
Therefore, to paraphrase the UDHR, a human right is based on an idea that there exists within 
the international sphere that a universal standard of rights which should be held in higher 
regard to local and cultural customs which are essential for dignity of human life.29 
 
The need for privacy is seen in all cultures and civilisations, a need as humans that certain 
types or actions are of a private nature and should be away from general observation. Clarity 
to what the actions are and what constitutes privacy has and is a difficult subject to define.   
 
Post suggested that: 
 
Privacy is a value so complex so entangled in competing and contradictory 
dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings that I sometimes despair 
whether it can be usefully addressed at all.30 
 
This inherent need for privacy is also coupled with some sort of expectation that the state that 
one resides in will protect their privacy. The protection of this privacy will be from unwanted 
observation from other members of the public and from the state itself. 
 
From Solove concept of privacy, in order to determine the action or behaviour that might 
cause an infringement of privacy and what level of protection might be needed it would be 
paramount to what the understood term of privacy meant. There would also need to be a 






Rengel explained that: 
 
The concept of privacy involves a definition of what it entails as well and how it is 
valued, while the right to privacy refers to the recognition that privacy should be 
legally protected.32 
 
Therefore, it is impossible to formulate an argument for the obscurity in cyberspace without 
having a definition firstly of what constitutes privacy and secondly what then should be 
legally protected as a privacy issue for individuals. 
 
As this article has suggested privacy has consistently been defined in the context of personal 
autonomy or having the innate control over the personal intimacies of personal identify or 
having control over the personal data which is available about yourself.33 Many definitions of 
privacy vary from one element of privacy to another but what is clear is that privacy at its 
core is about the protection of oneself from the outside world. 
 
Privacy can also be described as ‘claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for 
themselves when how and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others’34 or ‘privacy is the condition of human life in which acquaintance with a person or 
with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited.’35 
 
Solove has put privacy into six different concepts or general types based on his research: 
 
(1) The right to be left alone. 
(2) Limited access to the self, the ability to shield oneself from unwanted access by 
others.  
(3) Secrecy, the concealment of certain matters from others 
(4) Control over personal information, the ability to exercise control over information 
about oneself. 
(5) Personhood, the protection of ones’ personality, individuality and dignity and; 
(6) Intimacy, control over or limited access to ones’ intimate relationships or aspects of 
life.36 
 
These categories are on the face of it common sense approaches to privacy matters that most 
individuals would agree that on some level all human beings need a level of the right to be 
left alone, secrecy, control or personhood. However, the problem exists in that some 
individuals will value some privacy matters over others. Some for example may not value 
intimacy as an important protection. This can be seen in the use of Instagram to catalogue 
personal and private sometimes intimate images of oneself. So, the intrinsic problem lies in 
the notion that an overall definition of privacy may at times be out of reach or have to be 






Solove’s own definition of privacy is that: 
 
The value of privacy must be determined on the basis of its importance to society, not 
in terms of individual rights. Moreover, privacy does not have universal value that is 
the same across all contexts. The value of privacy in a particular context depends 
upon the social importance activities that it facilitates.37 
Therefore, Solove is also here looking at contextualising privacy, privacy which needs to 
change with time and maybe what privacy means to individuals and not the wider world 
interpretation of it. What an individual might hold dear in the scope of privacy might be very 
different to how another individual wants their privacy protected.  
Privacy as most would ascertain is a general right to be left alone, for an amount of secrecy, 
to keep from the outside world aspects of oneself that an individual want or needs to keep 
private. As Newell explains privacy can be then described in as a number of different 
protective rights from control over personal information, freedom from surveillance, 
protection from invasions into someone’s home, personal autonomy and control over one’s 
body.38 
Another viewpoint here is that the right to privacy is wrapped up in the notion of self-worth 
and these notions by the very fact of their existence means that society itself can function 
more efficiently and in turn can proceed with purpose when these rights are protected.  Regan 
suggest that ‘I argue that society is better off…. when privacy exists.  I maintain that privacy 
serves not just individual interests but common, public and collective purposes’.39  Reiman 
suggests that ‘privacy functions as a means of protecting freedom, moral personality and a 
rich and critical inner life.’40 
The right to privacy of course has long been recognised in the international community.  
There are several (spoken addressed in this article) international conventions and human 
rights treaties which mention privacy as a central issue. In conjunction with Article 28 of the 
ICCPR the HRC was formed which investigates or ‘monitors’ states implementations of 
rights including those pursuant to privacy.41  The HRC issued a General Comment on Article 
17 of the ICCPR (also discussed in this article) which embodies the right to privacy, 
discussing and clarifying concepts such as ‘arbitrary interference’ ‘family’ ‘home’ and 
‘correspondence’.  Although it must be stated again that the ICCPR is unclear as to what is 
always intended by these ‘general comments.42 
The General Comment does however look at the legal aspect to how the ICCPR should be 
able to have an interpretation to the right to privacy within the scope of international law.  
According to the HRC the term ‘unlawful’ as it appears in Article 17 set out that no one’s 
privacy must be interfered with unless reasoned by law.43 
The right to privacy is not only recognised in some of the most important international and 
regional human rights documents but they have also been recognised in almost every 





extended privacy protection through jurisprudence, procedural rules and other protections.  
Furthermore privacy has become a common element in most states.44 Although the right to 
privacy is not an absolute right and at times is infringed when other matters are at stake (like 
in light of public protection or criminal sanction) there must be a fine act of balancing the 
international community’s inherent recognition of the right to privacy and the private act it 
may or may not protect. 
The right to privacy includes the very idea that even though human interaction will often take 
place in the public sphere. This means that an individual will only give up their personal 
space when they feel safe to so. But in cyberspace this is a very different and difficult 
concept to ascertain. It has been stated that a right to obscurity in the digital age is not much 
more than a desirable goal and has little chance of being achieved in the reality.45 Obscurity 
can be described as a ‘state of unknowing or being unidentifiable online’.46 Out in the public 
space it is impossible for an observer to identify someone identity or personal data because 
they do not have the correct pieces of this puzzle to fit together as they do not have access to 
any personal information. For instance an observer who observes a conversation will be 
unlikely to ascertain any personal information about the individuals taking part in the 
conversation simply by observing them.   
Online obscurity is more complex but a person can remain obscure if a piece of vital personal 
information is missing like identity or social connections. But with some of these vital 
personal pieces fitting together, like for example social connections, the online observer can, 
if they have right tools, infiltrate private information much easier than if they were simply the 
observing a conversation taken place in public.   
Obscurity would only be fully realised through regulation that protects an individual’s 
information in which they wish to keep private. Therefore, if a right to privacy has been 
recognised within international treaties and national domestic legislation then surely 
obscurity is another function of privacy. 
Hartzog and Strutzman have suggested other frameworks that could lead to a protection of 
obscurity and protection of privacy on the internet.47 They have suggested that the protection 
of obscurity may be easier to implement than that of privacy recognition due in the main to 
the problematic nature of a widely accepted definition of a right to privacy. Obscurity they 
suggest could form a compromise remedy of protection. This would mean in essence instead 
of mandating that websites to remove sensitive information, the courts could propose some 
element of obscurity. So, companies storing personal information would have to keep the 
information online as it had been received, therefore if the individual did not want it to be 
exposed then it would not be exposed. 
Hartzog and Strutzman suggested framework however does bring with it a number of other 
problems in which the individual in the protection information may not be initially satisfied 
with. This again still puts the individual information received and what to do with it in the 





sensitive personal information. In light of Cambridge Analytica this seems problematic.  
What is needed is a stronger legal mandate to obscurity on the internet. 
Hartzog and Strutzman suggested four factors which could be used by the courts to determine 
whether some aspects should be deemed private or public. They suggested that if certain 
elements were missing from the public then they are closer to being obscure and should come 
with some element of a protection of privacy attached to them. These factors suggested are: 
(1) Search visibility (ease of discovery in search systems) 
(2) Unprotected access (degree of access restriction) 
(3) Identification (degree to which individual is identified by direct or indirect disclosure) 
(4) Clarity (ability for observer to comprehend or discover information)48 
 
Hartzog and Strutzman suggested the following as guidance: 
The presence of these factors diminishes obscurity, and their absence enhances it. 
Thus, in determining whether information is obscure online, courts should consider 
whether any of these factors were present in their determination. Information that is 
entirely unobscured is completely obvious, and vice versa. Like in fair use disputes, 
courts should engage in a case-by-case analysis of the factors, examining each one 
individually, then as a whole to determine the degree of online obscurity.49 
To expand the understanding of these four factors, Hartzog and Strutzman used the following 
scenarios: 
Scenario 1 is a blog that is visible only to invited users and is not searchable by 
general search engines like Google. It is close to being completely obscure because it 
is missing two of the most important factors for finding it. Scenario 2 is a Twitter 
account that uses only a first name and a blurry photo to identify the poster. While 
this information is more obvious than the information in Scenario 1 because it is 
freely searchable and accessible, it is still slightly obscure because only certain 
Internet users would be able to identify the poster of the content or completely 
comprehend any idiosyncratic posts.50 
Therefore, these determining factors as suggested by Hartzog and Strutzman are based on 
which elements are present for the courts to deem them to be obscure. If a user posts their 
name, a picture of themselves online in which they are easily identifiable then this cannot be 
a case of privacy and the individual cannot be assumed to have been trying to be obscure.  If 
however elements within these four factors are missing as in the scenarios above then the 
court could determine that there was an element of obscurity intended to be observed. 
There have been several US cases which the court has shown a balancing of the action taken 
by the user in determining whether the action is deemed private and obscure. In United States 
v Gines-Perez51 the Court held that a right to claim privacy is unavailable to a person if they 





discovery from the general public.  In contrast in Pietrylo v Hillstone Restaurant Group52 and 
an employee set up a private closed network page on Myspace with invitation only to join.  
The group was used mainly to convey frustration with their employer. When one of the 
managers obtained the password to the account, the creator of the group brought a case 
against the manager for an invasion of privacy. The Court held in favour of the infringement 
of privacy on the grounds that the group had been intended to be private and obscured from 
public view as it was by invitation only and each member had its own username and 
password. 		
 
Both the right to obscurity and the right to privacy are interlinked but are not helped by the 
current international guidelines not being clear enough on the protection of these rights. But 
clear guidelines on obscurity in the definition of what is private and what is public could help 
in making the protection and what should be protected clearer. 
 
3. Privacy protection under international law 
It is understood that in certain circumstances states and their governments carry out 
surveillance and data collection within the borders of their own territories. However, this 
does raise the question as to whether they can carry out such acts in foreign states. 
The scope of the ICCPR is clearly set out in Article 2(1) and sets out the following ‘states 
must respect and to ensure’ the rights recognised in the treaty ‘to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction.’53 The question of subject of under their jurisdiction 
raises questions of whom is under a state’s jurisdiction. Does this include individuals that are 
not within the territory of state? 
However, global surveillance within different states and different legal frameworks makes a 
clear distinction between external and internal communications. Most states (namely the Five 
Eyes54) have legislation which governs these actions. In the UK it is the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA)55, in the United States of America (USA or US) it is 
the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 197856, Australian Intelligence Services Act57 
and Canadian National Defence Act 1985.58 These legislative frameworks show the 
obligations of protection of nationals and those within the state’s territory and non-nationals 
who are living outside states territory.  
For the UK under ss.8(1) and (2) of the RIPA communications which are internal may only 
be used in surveillance when a warrant is issued and only on evidence of suspicion of 
unlawful activity.59 External communications are defined as communication sent or received 
outside the territory of the British Islands.60   
This problematic element which contrasts with ICCPR and Comment No 16 is that the 
conditions of evidence and warrant set out ss.8 (1) and (2) do not apply to external 
communications. This controversial element here is that the UK governments would seem to 





Google, Twitter and Facebook as their headquarters can be under surveillance as their data is 
held outside a British territory in the United States.61   
This therefore gives the UK government through its intelligence gathering agencies 
permission to use all these communications which are coming in and out of the UK by UK 
residents using companies such as Google, Twitter and Facebook. Another caveat to this is 
that under a general warrant under s 8(4) RIPA 2000 both residents of the UK and foreign 
nationals can have their communications monitored. 
The controversial nature of this was commented on by the HRC in a 2015 report in which it 
commented the following62: 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) that makes a distinction 
between internal and external communications, provides for untargeted warrants for 
the interception of external private communications and communication data, which 
are sent or received outside the United Kingdom without affording the same 
safeguards as in the case of interception of internal communications….the UK must 
review the regime regulating the interception of personal communications and 
retention of communication data with the view to ensuring that such activities both 
within and outside the State party, conform to its obligations under the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights including Article 17.63 
However, despite this request from the United Nations the UK made no concession on this 
point.  In the new Investigatory Powers Act 2016 under s 136(3) still allows for surveillance 
by their security forces to issue mass warrants to intercept ‘overseas related 
communications.’64 So again just reconfirming the infringement of an individual’s right to 
privacy protection as the RIPA 2000 does and on the face of it contrary to the ICCPR Article 
17. 
The concern is that the issue by individual states and information in the digital age is unclear.  
It is unclear on the extent to which information is being used by state agencies on the 
permission from governments. Many states seem to fragrantly absolve themselves from the 
obligations placed on them by ICCPR. The US government has refuted the obligation placed 
on it by ICCPR stating it is not bound by them. The US ratified the ICCPR in accordance 
with actions occurring outside its territory in 1992. Therefore, the US asserts that it is not 
legally bound to comply with ICCPR in respect to any surveillance operations over non-US 
communications systems or activities which are not housed in the US. This position asserts 
that the US states that the ICCPR obligations are restricted to very specific circumstances.  
These circumstances are when an individual is both within a state’s territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction. Therefore, if these two conditions are not satisfied then the foreign individual 
concerned does not benefit from privacy protection under the ICCPR.65   
In the UK state surveillance, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) has looked at the issue 
of the UK’s international law obligations and human rights protections of individuals privacy 
in the Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State.66 The Court here was concerned with the 





Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The case concerned a group of UK residents and a 
group of individuals that were not residing in the UK. Regarding the question of the rights to 
privacy for the individuals not residing in the UK the court expressed that ‘under Article 8 of 
the [European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)] the UK owes no obligation to persons 
who are situated outside its territory in respect of electronic communications between them 
which passes through the state.’67 The IPT when investigating, therefore, considered two 
issues in relation to infringement of privacy. The first issue of standing (whether such an 
individual could make a claim from being directly affected) the tribunal decided that all the 
applicants had standing if they could provide the information necessary for the investigation. 
The controversial element was the second issue of extraterritorial application of the ECHR. 
The Tribunal concluded that the ECHR was not applicable to individuals living abroad even 
if they have been the subject to surveillance by the state. 
Extraterritorial application concerns the issue of whether the ECHR applies to individuals 
abroad and whether states owe human rights protection to those individuals living outside 
their territory.68 The discussion is concerned with the interpretation of the term ‘jurisdiction’ 
within the ECHR. The IPT therefore was submitting the question that is an individual under 
the jurisdiction of the UK if they have been under surveillance by the state but the individual 
is not domiciled within the UK. 
The controversial issue of extraterritorial application decision by the IPT strikes is at the very 
center of the right to privacy. Communications via the digital medium do not have respect for 
national borders and neither do digital communication companies or state government.  Logic 
would suggest that the right to privacy should not be depended on an individual’s location 
and whether they are protected by article 8 of the ECHR. 
The findings in Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State have been controversial and have 
been criticized.69 As the IPT decisions cannot be subject to a direct appeal in the UK, 
therefore, the IPT decisions could be challenged by the ECtHR. 
 
3.1. ICCPR: Effective Control v Virtual Control 
 
If states are primarily basing the jurisdiction of privacy on territorial this would seem to not 
fit easily with the circumstances which are set out within international law. However, all 
human rights courts and bodies, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the HRC, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) that privacy issues may exist 
beyond merely a state’s territory and exist outside a state’s territory i.e. extraterritorially. 
 
This simply put means a state is therefore bound by international law in relation in 
individuals who may not be domiciled within the state borders but who under the control of 
its jurisdiction. The HRC has adopted the following approach (similar to effective control) to 
determine not only the jurisdiction but also the protection of an individual’s privacy where 





A state party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to anyone within the power or effective control 
of that State Party even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.70 
 
The IACHR established similar principles: 
The inquiry turns not on the presumed victim’s nationality or presence within a 
particular geographical area but on whether under specific circumstances the State 
observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and control.71 
 
How international law obligations may apply outside a state’s geographical territory is spilt 
into two different categories: spatial and personal models.  The spatial model sees jurisdiction 
as effective overall control over a specific geographical area, but the personal model sees it as 
a physical control over the individual in question.   
 
The spatial model was established in the ECtHR case Loizidou v Turkey. In this case the 
Court established ‘a state’s responsibility was engaged when as a consequence of lawful or 
unlawful military action it exercised effective control of an area outside its national 
territory.’72 In the International Court of Justice case DRC v Uganda it was held that the 
ICCPR applies ‘extraterritorially when a state is occupying territory of another state.’73   
 
However, both these examples seem to apply to military exposition and control but do not go 
far enough in everyday protection of individuals right to privacy. Milanovic stated that in 
some circumstances during conflict states could control areas without being in another state’s 
territory. For example, the use by a state of drones during conflict would have effective 
control over an area without physically being in another states territory.74 
 
The case of Lopez Burgos v Uruguay75 is important to note here, even though not directly 
about privacy it is important in the context of effective control of individuals and whether 
they should have the same protection of their rights regardless of where they are domiciled.  
In this case the applicant was alleged to have been kidnapped and tortured in Argentina by 
Uruguayan security and intelligence forces due to his trade union activities, despite having a 
visa to enter Austria and having political refugee statues granted by the UNHCR. The HRC 
emphasized in this case that an individual right and the protection of them do not diminish 
once they are domiciled in a foreign state. The HRC expressed these obligations in the 
following way: 
 
It would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under Article 2 of the 
ICCPR as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the 
territory of another State which violations it could not perpetrate on its own 
territory…a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant 
to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party even if not situated 
within the territory of the State Party…regardless of the circumstances in which such 






Therefore, a state must have under international law a human rights obligation by the means 
of the effective control over an individual. In times of conflict this rule would need to be 
extended to encompass the obligation of a state where there is the privacy of communications 
by an individual who is residing in a foreign state. 
 
The effective control test works well in times of conflict due to the physical nature of the 
definition and the finding of international courts but is harder to make it fit with modern 
privacy concerns over surveillance and interception of individual’s private communications. 
 
Margulies77 has suggested that the existing effective control test is ‘inadequate for the cyber 
and communications realm as it places the emphasis on the exercise of physical over persons 
or territory which is difficult to relate to cyberspace.’78 Therefore, Margulies suggested that 
the US which has unprecedented virtual power and the narrowly defined standard of privacy 
requiring physical control means that it is easy to exploit this gap by ignoring their human 
rights obligations. The US for example has relationships with communications companies 
allowing direct access to surveillance transmitting devices, undersea cables and other carriers 
of internet and telephonic communications.79 
 
Then international law must protect privacy by looking at the obligations in the controlling of 
communications not the effective control over physical areas or physical individuals. Nyst80 
argues that instead of looking at control as in physical control of territory it must be looked at 
in terms of when data or communications are intercepted within that states territory, the state 
in question should owe obligations to those individuals regardless of their location on the 
basis Nyst suggests of ‘interface-based jurisdiction’ that a state is not allowed to ‘interfere 
with communications that passes through its territorial borders.’81 
 
Nyst has the same thinking of Milanovic82 who distinguishes between the positive obligation 
of states to protect human rights and to preventing human rights violations by third parties 
and negative obligation of states to respect human rights that only require states to refrain 
from interfering with the rights of individuals without sufficient justification.83 Milanovic 
therefore is suggesting that within this construct it sees jurisdiction as a negative duty to not 
interfere and therefore all violations as negative when interfering with privacy.84 
 
Both Nyst and Milanovic approaches here look at the weakness of the privacy debate 
couched in the confines of the personal and spatial models and put at the center of their 
thinking that there must be an emphasis on the negative duty that states cannot interfere with 
rights that are protected. 
 
There is also a larger picture here which is not just about the protected right of interference of 
communication and storing of data. There is also the subject of collusion and the sharing of 
personal data between states which makes the obligation and protection of privacy so difficult 





simply engage in the notion of ‘collusion for circumvention.’85 GCHQ is allowed to 
essentially spy on anyone except British nationals86 and the NSA through the PRISM 
surveillance program is allowed to spy on anyone that is not American.87  
 
The PRISM program allows the NSA to collect communication from US internet 
communications companies. The collection of this data is governed by Section 702 FISA 
Amendments Act 2008 which allows communication data, encrypted data and search entries 
from companies such as Google, Yahoo and Microsoft to be transferred to the NSA.88 
 
The documents leaked by Edward Snowden suggested that PRISM is ‘the number one source 
of raw intelligence area for the NSA analytic reports and makes up approximately 91% of 
NSA internet acquired data.89 The US government has defended the use of PRISM stating 
that is can only be used on US nationals with a warrant and it has prevented act of 
Terrorism.90 
 
Then the data information collected by GCHQ and the NSA is shared between the two 
agencies and therefore enables each agency to circumvent any national restrictions that are in 
place protecting its own citizens right to privacy, as they are able to access this information 
that has been gathered on their own citizens by foreign governmental agencies.91   
 
There has also been a suggestion of the ‘virtual control test’. This was proposed by 
Margulies92 who suggested that a virtual control test would make the ICCPR and other 
international human rights treaties applicable when a state can assert ‘virtual control’ over an 
individual’s communications even if the state does not have control over the territory the 
individual is located.93 Margulies suggests that virtual control would mean when a state 
intercepts, stores and analyses an individual’s communications.  
 
Of course, this test is a suggestion and has not be accepted or adopted by the international 
community as the expansion or different approach to privacy and the protection of it. Paust 
has criticised the approach as it has little or no shared legal expectation about personal 
jurisdiction and privacy.94 
 
However, such an approach does not fit with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in the case of 
Jaloud v Netherlands.95  For example, in this case the court took a more expansive approach 
and extraterritorial jurisdiction in privacy matters was suggested, because the state can 
‘exercise authority and control over individuals right to life which made the physical nature 
of effective control unimportant.’96 
 
A virtual control test would ensure equal treatment of all individuals not dependent on their 
location because the establishing a virtual control test would not depend on where the 
communications took place but rather on whether a state can have control of it even if its 






The HRC has addressed this matter head on suggesting extraterritorial surveillance does not 
affect the right to privacy and the ICCPR.  The HRC suggested: 
 
The Committee is concerned about the surveillance of communications in the interest 
of protecting national security conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA) 
conducted both within and outside the United States.97 
 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner also addressed the issue: 
 
Digital surveillance may engage a State’s human rights obligations if that surveillance 
involves the State’s exercise of power or effective control in relation to digital 
communications infrastructure, wherever found for example through direct tapping or 
penetration of that infrastructure. Equally where a State exercises regulatory 
jurisdiction over a third party that physically controls the data that State also would 
have obligations under the Covenant.98 
 
The Special Rapporteur observed: 
 
State’s jurisdiction is not only engaged where State agents place data interceptors on 
fibre-optic cables travelling through their jurisdictions but also where a State 
exercises regulatory authority over the telecommunications or Internet service 
providers that physically control the data.99 
 
The UN General Assembly when adopting Resolution 68/167 expressed: 
 
At the negative impact that surveillance including extraterritorial surveillance in 
particular when carried out on a mass scale may have on the exercise and enjoyment 
of human rights.100 
 
Therefore, it can be seen that a virtual control test is needed as the elements which make up 
the effective control test over privacy do not fit the digital age. It is impossible to know 
where and how physical control is made in the traditional sense and where in the traditional 
sense territorial control is ascertained. This is because with digital communications, all such 
communications are sent through various different territories and jurisdictions before the 
reach their destination of the user.  So, what becomes important, is whether the control virtual 
can be implemented regardless of where the individual is located or their nationality. 
 
All these viewpoints look to a need for the international community and the UN to look again 
at the Article 17 of the ICCPR and issue a new Comment stipulating the protection of privacy 








3.2. United Nations and the future of surveillance 
 
The international community has taken steps to look at enhancing the protection of privacy 
since the adoption of the ICCPR in 1966 and the subsequent HRC’s adoption of General 
Comment No 16 on the right to privacy in 1988.101 These steps do include a focus on human 
rights and surveillance practices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
UN Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression and Counter-Terrorism. The adoption of 
both UN General Assembly Resolutions and the UN Human Rights Council Resolutions on 
the right to privacy showed a focus on the issues by the international community. The 2015 
creation of a UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy shows the focus on international 
importance of privacy. The HRC has also addressed surveillance legislation in its Concluding 
Observations to States.  Also, the ECtHR, the CJEU and the Inter-American Commission and 
Court on Human Rights have developed a jurisprudence on right to privacy. 
 
There are of course the arguments (as this article has already suggested) that these steps are 
not progressive enough. Most of these advancements are merely regional agreements or soft 
law principles without much real binding force on states and their behaviour towards the right 
to privacy. 
 
However, some of these advancements have started to influence the behaviour of states 
towards the intrusion of states into individual’s privacy. Canada’s decision to stop the sharing 
of intelligence data with its Five Eyes partners was in direct response to the evidence of the 
unlawful surveillance of Canadians.102 In 2014 the German Parliamentary Committee 
investigating the spy scandal involving the National Security Agency (NSA) has led to a 
lessening of the cooperation between the Federal Intelligence Agency (BND) and the NSA.103  
Also, there has been an increase in privacy cases being decided by German Courts.104 
 
The UN has reaffirmed its commitment to the question of the protection of data in the digital 
age in Human Rights Council Resolution adopted in 2017 which reaffirmed its commitment 
to the issue by reaffirming many privacy issues that had previously been decided. 
 
In 2015 via Resolution 28/16 the UN Human Rights Council decided to appoint after 
international community interest in the OHCHR Report into privacy a Special Rapporteur on 
the right to privacy for a period of three years.105 The resolution directed the Special 
Rapporteur to report on alleged violations of the right to privacy including in particular 
concerns arising from new technologies. With this mandate in mind all member states were 
urged to cooperate fully with the office of the Special Rapporteur. 
 
The main findings from the Special Rapporteur can be seen in the right to privacy report; 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy from 27 February 2019.106 In the 
report the Special Rapporteur states that the ‘right to privacy can facilitate the enjoyment of 
other human rights. Equally its infringements constrain the enjoyment of other human 





they have signed up to stating: ‘there are several historical examples of Member States 
ratifying international instruments on human rights while lacking the genuine will to take the 
necessary measures for their implementation.’108 The example used is former German 
Democratic Republic who signed the ICCPR in 1973 but was still openly using a surveillance 
regime against its citizens. The report went on to state that today there were similar 
contradictions.  Many states commit themselves to protecting the right to privacy but are also 
acting in ways which puts this privacy at risk.109 
 
The report used a Sieghart quote to explain that the right to privacy is integral to personal 
autonomy, the links between privacy, information flows, autonomy and power exist.110  
Sieghart suggests the following: 
 
In a society where modern information technology is developing fast, many others 
may be able to find out how we act. And that, in turn, may reduce our freedom to act 
as we please – because once others discover how we act, they may think that it is in 
their interest, or in the interest of society, or even in our own interest to dissuade us, 
discourage us, or even stopping us from doing what we want to do, and seek to 
manipulate us to do what they want to do.111 
 
The above position the Special Rapporteur linked to privacy in the following way112: 
 
Shorn of the cloak of privacy that protects him, an individual becomes transparent and 
therefore manipulable. A manipulable individual is at the mercy of those who control 
the information held about him, and his freedom, which is often relative at best, 
shrinks in direct proportion to the extent of the nature of the options and alternatives 
which are left open to him by those who control the information.113 
 
The report therefore clearly sets out the importance of the protection of privacy and it states 
‘infringing upon privacy is often part of a system which threatens other liberties.’114 The 
report also reaffirmed the position of the HRC`s resolution of March 2017115 that ‘States 
should ensure that any interference with the right to privacy is consistent with the principles 
of legality, necessity and proportionality.’116 
 
The main privacy recommendations of the report included the following117: 
 
47. The incorporation by UN Member States into their domestic legal system of the 
standards and safeguards set out in Convention 108+ Article 11118, for the protection 
of the fundamental right to privacy, especially: 
 
 (a) the creation of legal certainty by ensuring that any and all privacy-intrusive 
measures. 






(c) the establishment of one or more independent oversight authorities empowered by 
law and adequately resourced by the State. 
 
48. (a) All UN Member States should amend their laws to empower their independent 
authorities entrusted with oversight of intelligence activities, to specifically and 
explicitly, oversight of all personal information exchanged between the intelligence 
agencies of the countries for which they are responsible. 
 
In conclusion119 the Special Rapporteur again expressed the importance of the right to 
privacy for individuals within the international community: 
 
102. The confidence of individuals to share ideas and to assemble is also fundamental 
to the health of societies and democracy. The loss of privacy can lead to a loss of this 
confidence including confidence in Government and institutions established to 
represent the public interests, withdrawal from participation, which can adversely 
impact and undermine representative democracies. 
 
103. While privacy rights are not costless, or free of risks to governments, the 
challenges are outweighed by our collective interest in democracy. The right to 
privacy for women, as well as children and individuals of diverse sexual orientations, 
gender identities, gender expressions and sex characteristics, is critically important for 
all of the reasons outlined above and reported in submissions.  
 
108. Transparency is needed in how private companies use personal data of users, and 
respond to reports of online harassment. Greater gender diversity among those 
shaping online experiences is important for making products and platforms safer, 
more socially-responsible and accountable.  
 
Therefore, throughout the findings of the Special Rapporteur and specifically the 
recommendations and conclusions from the report that the right to privacy is an area which 
needs protection and the cooperation of states within the UN to insure that individual`s 
privacy or the obscurity of certain information is a protected right. 
 
 
4. Cambridge Analytica and the right to privacy 
This part of this article will focus on the way forward for the right to privacy after the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal and how this may be a focus for reevaluation of the what is 
privacy and who should hold the key to private information of individuals. Whether this is 
the inherent right to privacy which is incumbent in international treaties or the right to 
obscurity in cyberspace one element is clear and that there is a need for tightening up of the 
law in this area to be clear for those companies that hold individual’s information on what 





On March 17 2018, the New York Times and the Guardian published stories exposing that 
the personal data of over 50 million Facebook users were in the possession of a company 
called Cambridge Analytica.120 Cambridge Analytica was a company121 which had links not 
only to the 2016 US election but also the 2016 UK Brexit Referendum.122 
Cambridge Analytica was a British political data consulting firm which combined data 
mining, data brokerage and data analysis with strategic communication which used 
specifically during election campaigns.123 The personal data of up to 87 million Facebook 
users were acquired via the 270,000 Facebook users who used an app called ‘This is Your 
Digital Life’.  By giving this third party app permission to acquire data (in 2015) this also 
gave the app access to information which was stored on the apps user’s associate networks  
Therefore this resulted in data of about 87 million users, the vast majority of who had not 
given Cambridge Analytica the permission to access their personal data.124 
Cambridge Analytica were based on a system engineered by Michal Kosinski. The system 
was based around a profiling system of general online data from likes on Facebook and data 
collected from smartphones. Kosinski suggested that with a limited number of ‘likes’ 
individuals can be analysed more efficiently and individual psychological targeting is a 
powerful tool to influence people.125 Cambridge Analytica would then collect data on 
potential voters using this data via such actions as demographics, consumer behaviour and 
internet activity.  According to The Guardian, the data used psychological data derived from 
millions of Facebook users without permission.126 Other sources of information included the 
‘Cruz Crew’ which was a mobile app that tracked physical movements and contacts.127 
The use and collection of personal data without permission raises privacy issues and ethical 
concerns. But Cambridge Analytica company base was in the United States and privacy laws 
are not enacted with protecting privacy. The Cruz Crew app’s database has been described as 
“political-voter surveillance.”128 
Cambridge Analytica scope was wide and influence widespread. In India Cambridge 
Analytica was used by the Indian National Congress to carry out analysis of the electorate 
and influence voters in the 2010 elections.  It was found that 355 Indian Facebook users had 
installed a Cambridge Analytica app which then in turn exposed the data of 562,455 other 
users. The Indian National Congress was also given data information by Cambridge 
Analytica for the 2019 general elections.129 Cambridge Analytica ran secret campaigns in 
Kenya for the 2013 and 2017 elections.130 There are also accusations that Cambridge 
Analytica had influence on elections in Australia, Malta and Mexico.131 
However, by far the most controversial influence Cambridge Analytica had was alleged to 
have had was on the US 2016 Presidential elections and the 2016 EU Referendum in the UK 
is seen as the most controversial. 
Cambridge Analytica became involved in the 2016 UK European Union Membership 
Referendum (commonly known as Brexit) using data to convince ‘persuadable’ voters to vote 





Observer and the Guardian suggested respectively that Cambridge Analytica had influenced 
the Vote Leave campaign and Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign.133 It was claimed 
that Cambridge Analytica had produced a document claiming that it could affect the outcome 
of the referendum with the data it had collected. The document was entitled ‘Big Data 
Solutions for the EU Referendum’ and claimed it could single out vote leave voters, donors, 
politicians and journalists.134 
In March 2018 Christopher Wylie a former Cambridge Analytica employee told the UK 
Electoral Commission that a firm linked to Cambridge Analytica helped the official Vote 
Leave campaign by circumventing the financing laws in place during the EU referendum.135 
Cambridge Analytica involvement in the 2016 presidential primaries for the Republican Party 
became known in July 2015.136 As of December that same year Cambridge Analytica claimed 
to have collected up to 5,000 data points on over 220 million US citizens.137 After Ted Cruz 
dropped out of the Republican presidential nomination race, Cambridge Analytica started to 
work closely with Republican candidate Donald Trump.   
On 18 May 2017 the US Congress started to investigate Cambridge Analytica in connection 
with possible Russian interference in the 2016 US election campaign.138  It was suggested the 
Cambridge Analytica breached data privacy by spreading Russian propaganda using micro 
targeting.139 In 2018 it was found that Cambridge Analytica had used 50 million Facebook 
users personal data without permission while assisting Donald Trump’s presidential 
campaign. This information it was suggested was used to influence the US election in Donald 
Trump’s favour.140   
In the UK the Information Commissioners Office (ICO) conducted an investigation into data 
analytics for political purposes and in response to the Cambridge Analytica scandal obtained 
new and stronger powers as the UK Data Protection Act 2018. In November 2018 the ICO 
published its report to Parliament on the use of data in political campaigns and highlighted:  
 
A disturbing disregard for voters’ personal privacy by players across the political 
campaigning system from data companies and data brokers to social media platforms, 
campaign groups and political parties.141 
Mark Zuckerberg (CEO Facebook) announced in March 2019 that Facebook would build a 
‘privacy focused messaging and social networking platform.’142  He was criticised for failing 
to address whether the company would stop purchasing information from data analysts, 
harvesting data from individuals not using Facebook.143 
 
The importance of the discussion on Cambridge Analytica is its impact on the wider 
discussion on the protection of privacy. After the scandal broke it seems that the international 
community has been forced into action on the right to privacy and access to data issues. This 
has seen investigations in Italy Germany and Canada. These investigations have all led to the 





Within the discussions of this article, Cambridge Analytica and the focus it put on privacy 
does not seem to have influenced any enhancements in fundamental international legal 
protection of privacy. It seems that it has had a greater influence on regional discussion and 
region reform. If international law had a more robust approach to how privacy should be 
protected and more measures which are not on a voluntary basis, then international human 
rights law would and should be the basis of protection from the privacy breach seen by 
Cambridge Analytica and any future incarnation. 
 
Therefore, without the necessary framework in place it would seem privacy protection from 




5. Future development of privacy protection under international law 
 
There is data protection, as this article has set out in UDHR, ICCPR and an interpretation of 
data protection guaranteed by the UNHRC. The protection of privacy within international law 
is uncertain due to several competing factors. 
 
International human rights treaties (like the ICCPR) do not mention the need for data 
protection specifically and the guidance and guarantees are very broad which leaves little 
room for direct guidance for the courts. 
 
International legal framework is fragmented between international human rights law, regional 
legal agreement and national legal agreements. For example, there is a fundamental rights 
approach in EU law144 in the protection of individual privacy contrasting with the US 
approach145 based on a more consumer protection approach. As Kittichaisaree and Kuner 
state few states agree with position of the US that international law does not preclude 
unauthorized intelligence gathering as long as the activity does not involve commercial or 
industrial espionage or the destruction of data.146 
 
A future development of protection under international law could take three main areas of 
privacy rights protection. 
 
Firstly, there is a need for a more precise normative framework based on what is privacy and 
obscurity for the courts or a new legal framework to address. This could be based on Hartzog 
and Strutman four factors for recognition of what is private and what is public privacy as 
discussed early in this article.147 
 
Secondly, to draft a new international agreement dealing with data protection. This would 
have the profound advantage of setting out a clear, precise framework based around privacy 
protection. However, there are obstacles to such an agreement. An agreement between all 





against the wider needs of society. For example, states would still uphold the right of 
infringement of privacy in light of terrorism concerns. There might also be the practical 
barrier that a treaty-based solution might not provide the most adequate remedy in an area 
which is as fast moving as data protection and future technologies. 
 
Thirdly, international law could accept that data protection is too fragmented to have one 
centralised hierarchical system of protection. Kittichaisaree and Kuner suggest that this 
would allow data protection to develop on a regional and national level though international 
cooperation, therefore allowing privacy protection that could develop over time that states 
could adopt voluntarily at a national level providing a common internationalised approach to 
the protection of privacy.148 
 
It is clear what is needed is a holistic approach from the international community which 
brings together implementation of data protection laws at a national level which could then 




6. Conclusion  
 
Individuals place a great deal of importance on the notion of privacy. There is an inherent 
right of the individual to protect one’s personal and private thoughts and actions. The right to 
protect privacy is important in establishing and forming human relationships. There is also a 
very real link between the need for privacy and the connection to dignity as human beings. 
 
As this article has shown at the international level there is evidence through treaty level 
implementation to the continuing discussion at the UN level that privacy and the existence of 
privacy is a fundamental right which exists as a universal principle of human existence. The 
need to protect this right is something which is becoming increasingly important and 
increasingly difficult within the digital age. The difficulty comes in the fact that much of our 
protected privacy is now within the digital sphere making the protection from surveillance 
and intrusion from the state much harder to regulate. 
 
The right to privacy can be recognised as the following: 
 
Privacy is a fundamental human right that has been defined as the presumption that 
individuals should have an area of autonomous development, interaction and liberty, a 
‘private sphere’ with or without interaction with others and free from state 
intervention and free from excessive unsolicited intervention by other uninvited 
individuals.149 
 
The evidence that the right to privacy is now considered to be within the higher scope of 





and within international customary law.  Of course, there is a cavate to this which is prevalent 
within the international law sphere that this right to privacy is not an absolute right and in 
most cases this right is balanced against the interest of states. 
 
The legal definition of a right to privacy needs to be a continuous process. The development 
and advances of new technology means that this area needs to be constantly adaptable to 
change. These developments will constantly make the application and protection of the need 
of an individual’s privacy much more complex. As technology advances the temptation of 
states to use individual data becomes greater. 
 
The current legal framework in international law is at times unclear. The UN through the 
Special Rapporteur is clear in reinforcing the rights protected under the ICCPR, UDHR, 
HRC`s General Comment no 17 and others but states are, especially through the Five-Eye 
states infringing individual rights, collecting data on individuals and using such data without 
permission. 
 
Privacy and its protection are a complex notion and there are not any failsafe routes to 
individual privacy protection. There is a fundamental right to be left alone and elements of 
this article has discussed whether an individual has a right to obscurity in the digital age.  
This article shows there are positive steps being made in the international community for the 
protection of individual privacy. However, the one thing is clear is that the law and 
international law in particular must be clearer and more robust to protect the individual from 
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